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The presence  of large informal  sectors is one of the most important  characteristics
of developing  countries. The study of the informal  economy  is important  inasmuch  as it
sheds light on how the state's regulatory and enforcement systems affect economic
performance.
There are a few different definitions  and approaches  to the study of the informal
sector  in the development  economics  literature.' This paper's approach follows  the work
by Hernando  de Soto  (1989)2,  according  to which the informal  sector is defined as the set
of economic  units that  do not comply  with government-imposed  taxes and regulations. As
Portes, Castells, and Benton (1989, p.  12) put it, "The informal economy is ...  a process
of  income-generation  characterized by  one central feature: it is unregulated by the
institutions of society, in a legal and social environment  in which similar activities are
regulated.  "
The informal sector arises when excessive  taxes and regulations  are imposed  by
government  that lack  the capability  to enforce  compliance.  An excessive  regulatory  system
makes  the formal economy  unattractive  by imposing  high entry costs to legality -through
license  fees and registration  requirements-  and high costs to remain legal -through  taxes,
red tape, and, among others, labor and environmental  regulations.
However,  escaping  taxes  and  regulations  is not  costless. An informal  status entails
many  disadvantages. Informal  activities  are subject  to stiff penalties in the form of fines
or capital confiscation. Furthermore, because of their illegal  status, informal  agents do
not fully  enjoy  public  services,  particularly  those  that allow  them full, enforceable  property
-1-rights  over their  capital and output. This has a number  of negative  consequences: First,
informal  producers  are poorly protected  by the police and the judicial courts from crimes
committed  against  their property. Second,  since  they  lack  the capacity to enter into legally
binding contractual  obligations, their access to capital markets, for financial, insurance,
and corporative purposes, is seriously impaired. Lastly, they find obstacles  to use other
public  services  such  as social  welfare, skill training programs,  and government-sponsored
credit facilities.
The state, as the institution  that both monitors the regulatory and enforcement
systems  and administers  public services, plays a crucial  role in the formation of informal
economies. If state  officials, or interest  groups related  to them, profit in some way from
the presence  of the informal  sector,  they  will create  an environment  that makes informality
attractive  or simply unavoidable. To the extent that excessive  regulations  are created to
benefit  particular interest  groups  and not society in general, the presence  of the informal
sector  is a result of the failure of political  institutions  to protect and promote an efficient
market economy.
This paper  attempts  to organize  the current information  on the determinants  of the
informal sector and its effect on economic  growth through, first, a simple endogenous
growth model and, second, empirical evidence from Latin America.  The next section
describes the main determinants  and features of the informal sector. 3 Then, the paper
models the presence  of the informal sector in the economy  and its relationship  to output
growth  within  the framework  of the endogenous  growth literature, 4 specifically,  the work
in which  government's  provision  of public  goods and services  is considered  explicitly, as
-2-in Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1992). The empirical section of the paper
uses  data from Latin  American  countries  to test some of the implications  of the model and
to provide  estimates  of the relative size of the informal  sector throughout  these countries.
THE RATIONALITY  OF BEING  INFORMAL
Economic  units  choose  to be partially  or completely  informal  by weighing  the costs
and benefits  a legal  status  entails  and considering  their particular institutional  and resource
constraints. In this sense, the choice to be informal  is a rational one, a fact which does
not imply that some firms are not forced by their constraints to be either formal or
informal.
The costs and benefits of legality are now analyzed in detail.  The presentation
adopts  de Soto's analytical  framework  as well as some of his reported evidence. De Soto
studied the informal  sector in Peru.  Other researchers  have applied his methodology  to
a variety of different  countries. Chickering  and Salahdine  (1991) present evidence  from
selected underdeveloped  Asian countries.  Tokman (1992) offers evidence from Latin
America and the Caribbean. These empirical findings also contribute to the following
presentation.
The Costs of Formality
The costs of formality  can be divided into costs to access the formal sector and
costs to remain in the formal  sector.
Costs to access the formal sector.  De Soto and his research group conducted
various experiments  to quantify the access costs.  In one of them, they set up a small
clothing factory in the outskirts  of Lima and tried to register it legally. Four university
-3-students were hired to do the necessary paperwork  under the supervision of a lawyer
specialized  in Administrative  Law. It was convened  that  no bribes  would be offered unless
there was no other means to proceed with the registration.  During the months the
experiment  lasted, government  officials  asked for bribes ten times;  in two cases, it was
absolutely necessary to pay them.  It took ten months to complete the registration
procedure.  Licenses  and other requirements  cost 195 dollars, and the loss in utilities
caused  by the ten-month  waiting  period was estimated  at 1,037 dollars.  In fact, the total
cost  of legal  registration  was equivalent  to 32 times  the minimum  monthly  salary.  By way
of comparison, Chickering  and Salahdine (1991) report that a similar procedure takes
three-and-a-half  hours in Florida and four hours in New York.
Tokman (1992) also finds high access costs to legality in other Latin American
countries.  Financial  costs of entry, excluding required modifications  in the business'
premises,  are estimated  at an average  of ten percent  of annual  profits;  when modifications
in the premises  are required  as part of the registration  procedure, these financial  costs rise
significantly.  Tokman  finds that the average  time to register a small firm in his group of
Latin  American  countries  is ten months, going from about one month (in Bolivia, Brazil,
and Chile) to two years (in Guatemala).  Given the long time involved in fulfilling
business  registration  requirements,  Tokman  (1992,  p.12)  concludes  that  "...  the
combination  of regulation inadequacy and bureaucratic  inefficiency ...  applies to most
countries  and particularly  to [Ecuador, Guatemala,  and Peru]."
Costs to remain in the formal sector. Staying formal can also be very costly.
De Soto finds that, in a sample of 50 small manufacturing  firms, the costs of staying
-4-formal represent an average  of 348 percent of after-tax profits.  De Soto reports that 22
percent  of such costs  are due to taxes, 5 percent due to higher public utility rates, and 73
percent due to regulations  (mainly  labor related) and bureaucratic  requirements.
The costs of staying formal can be divided into three broad categories:  taxes,
regulations,  and bureaucratic  requirements.
Taxes  on  formal firms constitute a  major source of  government revenue,
particular!y in developing countries.  Since formal firms are  registered with  state
organizations  and, thus, can be audited with relative ease, they are attractive  targets for
taxation.  This  is especially true in  countries that lack strong,  well-equipped tax
administrations  to properly monitor individuals  and informal firms.  Burgess  and Stern
(1993)  report that in developing  countries, corporate income  taxes represent 17.8 percent
of total tax revenues, while individual  income  taxes, only 10.6 percent. In contrast, for
industrial countries corporate income taxes account for only 7.6 percent of total tax
revenues, while individual income taxes carry most of the weight with 27.7 percent.
Confronted with a narrow base of formal firms, most underdeveloped  countries have
imposed, at least until recently, very high marginal  tax rates.
Regulations control the use of resources, the manner of production, and the
distribution of output and profits.  Common types of regulations are those related to
environmental  protection,  allocation  of imported inputs, consumer  protection  and quality
control, financial  capital availability,  and workers' welfare. Of all types of regulations,
those related to workers' welfare are the most restrictive and costly in underdeveloped
countries  (and in many  developed  countries  as well).  Regulations  designed, in theory, to
-5-improve  workers'  welfare  appear  in various  forms,  namely,  minimum wages,  fringe
benefits  (paid vacations and sick leave,  indemnities, health insurance),  social security,
constraints on free hiring and dismissal, and protection to unions.  Portes, Castells, and
Benton (1989, p. 30) argue that "the best-known economic effect of the informalization
process  is to reduce  the costs of labor substantially,"  costs which  are  mostly due  to
"indirect wages" such as benefits and social security contributions.  Tokman writes that
for small firms in Latin America, the additional costs related to labor regulations are the
most important component of the permanency costs in the formal sector.  Tokman (1992)
reports  that such regulations  increase labor costs by an average of around  20 percent,
which is about equally divided between benefits and social security contributions.  Nipon
(1991) estimates that informal firms in Thailand, by ignoring labor-protection  laws, save
about 13 to 22 percent of labor wages.
Mazumdar (1976) cites the interesting  example of the labor practices in the Bombay
textile industry:  Unions, enforcing government regulations,  protected  formal workers
against salary decreases or dismissals and ensured social benefits for them.  In response,
textile companies kept the number of formal workers as low as possible;  and when their
business required a higher labor input, they would supplement the stable core of formal
workers with casual day laborers, who were abundant in Bombay.  Not surprisingly,  these
casual  day workers, who constitute the informal labor force for the industry,  were paid
lower wages, had no job security, and enjoyed no fringe benefits.  This example illustrates
labor market conditions in many cities of the developing world.
In  most developing countries,  capital is scarce relative to  labor.  This  should
-6-induce  firms  to choose  labor-intensive  technologies.  However,  because labor-employment
regulations  raise labor costs, formal firms in developing  countries  tend to be abnormally
capital intensive.  5
Bureaucratic  requirements  (red tape and paper work) are also a significant  cost of
remaining  formal.  Alonzo (1991, pp. 48-49) reports that in the Philippines, "no matter
how small  the business,  an owner needs  an accountant  and a lawyer  to comply with all of
the requirements." Chickering  and Salahdine  (1991, p. 191) write that in Egypt, "much
of  the  country's  entrepreneurial talent is consumed in circumventing the country's
nightmare bureaucratic  regulatory system."  De Soto (1989) surveyed 37 formal firms
operating in areas in which informal firms abound.  He found that 40 percent of the
administrative personnel working time is spent fulfilling the bureaucratic paper work
imposed  by the state.
The Costs of Informality
Informal enterprises  face two kinds of costs:  First, penalties  when the informal
activity is detected, and second, the inability to take full advantage of government-
provided goods.  Penalties  for informal  activities  are usually  stiff;  very often, detected
firms have to surrender a considerable  part of their output or physical  capital stock.  De
Soto  (1989)  finds that  informal  entrepreneurs  pay between 10 to 15 percent of their gross
income in bribes to corrupt government  officials, whereas  formal entrepreneurs  pay an
average of only 1 percent of gross income in bribes (without counting bribes used to
become formal).  In order to avoid being caught, firms scale down the size of their
informal operations. In the case of purely informal  firms, the efforts to avoid detection
-7-prevent them from achieving  economies  of scale and from choosing  an optimal capital-
labor mix;  this is so because larger and more physical capital-intensive  firms are easier
to detect.
The second  cost  of informality  is the inability  to take full advantage  of government-
provided  goods, in particular  the legal and  judicial system and the police.  Since informal
activities  are illegal, informal  businessmen  cannot  exercise full property rights over their
capital  and product. Therefore,  contracts  related  to informal  activities  can not be enforced
through  the judicial system and, thus, their value and usefulness  are greatly diminished.
The inability to sign contracts enforceable  through the courts creates uncertainty and
increases the transaction and monitoring costs in all business dealings conducted by
informal companies.  This reduces investment  that comes both from internal sources
(retained earnings) and from capital markets.  De Soto (1989) provides an interesting
example of low investment  from internal  sources; he studies informal  housing, that is,
construction  on land over which families  have not yet secured a property title.  De Soto
finds  that  before  obtaining  their land titles, families  invest as little as possible in building
their  houses  and prefer investing  in other durables; however, once the property titles are
issued  by the state, families  shift their investment  to build and improve their houses.
Investment from capital markets is also severely affected  by the lack of proper
contracts. In fact, the inefficiency  of capital markets is manifested  in several ways: the
high  borrowing  rates  paid  by informal  firms, the relatively low value of informal  physical
capital,  and the difficulty  to transfer  property and create common-stock  corporations. De
Soto (1989)  points  out that in Lima, in June 1985,  the nominal  borrowing  rate for informal
-8-firms was 22 percent monthly, whereas  for formal firms of comparable  size, it was 4.9
percent. Huq and Sultan  (1991)  report  that in Bangladesh,  in 1988, firms which depended
on noninstitutional  sources to meet their financial needs paid rates between 48 to 100
percent annually, whereas the borrowing rate from commercial banks was around 12
percent.  The difficulty to transfer and mortgage property and create common-stock
corporations  limits  the informal  firms' ability to expand, manage  their risk, and use more
advanced  technologies.
The high cost of capital faced by informal  firms coupled with their low cost of
labor (due to their non-compliance  with labor laws) induces them to be more labor
intensive  than their formal counterparts.
As the costs  of informality  rise, the incentives  for an enterprise  to become  formal
become  stronger. On the other hand, paradoxically,  the higher these costs are, the more
difficult it is for an informal  enterprise  to accumulate  the wealth that would enable it to
enter the formal sector.  Credit constraints and the inability to form common-stock
corporations  prevent informal companies  from growing and, thus, from being able to
afford the access costs to the formal economy.
A SIMPLE ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
The following  model  attempts  to organize  some  of the information  presented in the
previous section on the determinants  of the informal  sector and its effect on economic
growth.  To keep the model manageable,  the paper ignores some aspects  of informality
that, although important, have been well studied in other papers, namely, the issues of
capital-labor intensity, labor-market  segmentation,  and size of firms.  These aspects  of
-9-informality  have been examined by, among others, Chaudhuri (1989), Gupta (1993),
Rauch (1991), and Loayza (1994).
Setup 6
The economy is populated  by agents endowed  with a (possibly  different) starting
level  of a broad measure  of capital, which is meant  to include  physical as well as human
capital.  They operate a technology  that exhibits constant  returns to capital (a la Rebelo
1991)  to produce  a single  good, which can be either consumed  or invested. Raw labor is
not an input of production. We follow  Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1992) in assuming  that
the capital rate of return depends  on the available  amount of public services relative to
aggregate  production. The basic production function is then given by
Y. = A  G  k  O<a  (1)
where,  Yi and 4 are, respectively, production and capital owned by agent i; A is an
exogenous  productivity  parameter; G is the flow of public services; Y  is total production
in the economy;  and a,  the elasticity of output with respect to GIY, measures the
productivity of public services relative to private services.
There are two sectors to which agents choose  to belong at any point in time: The
formal  and informal  sectors. Formal  agents pay a proportional income  tax, the proceeds
of which  are used  to both finance  the provision  of public  services (G) and partially pay for
the enforcement system.  As explained  below, tax revenues can also be wasted; this
-10-captures  the fact  that some  regulations  and taxes imposed  by government  are unproductive
and/or misused. Informal  agents  pay a proportional  fraction  of their income  as penalties.
We assume  that  the proceeds  from penalties  are used  both as bribes  to government  officials
and to partially finance government's  enforcement  system (the tax administration  in this
simple  case); therefore,  informal  penalty revenues  are not used to pay for public services
contained in G.  Because  of their illegal status, informal agents have access only to a
fraction of available public services. Therefore, according  to the sector agent i belongs
to, his net-of-tax/penalty  income is given by
Yi  (1-t)A(  )  k 1 0<1<1
(2)
Yi=  (1-7r)A(  2)  k 1 0<rr<1
where, r is the tax rate,  1! is the effective  penalty rate, 8 is the fraction  of public services
available  to informal  agents,  and the superscripts  F and I denote, respectively, formal and
informal  status.
Define  I as the relative size of the informal  sector, that is,
Y'
I  (3)
Public  services  are exclusively  financed  by taxes (on formal production)  according
to the following  rule,
-11  -G = n(q,X) (  Y F),  0'(  < I
(4)
in>o, @n<,  d 2r8>0 aq  '  ax  axaq
where ri(.) is the fraction  of tax revenues  available for the provision of public services.
The fraction I-i(.)  of tax revenues is in part wasted and in part used to finance the
enforcement system.  We assume that rj(.) is a  positive function of  the quality of
government  institutions  (proxied  by the parameter  q).  This captures the fact that higher-
quality government  institutions  impose  fewer wasteful  regulations  and administer  fiscal
resources more efficiently. Also, given that increasing  enforcement  effectiveness  takes
away fiscal resources, ri(.) is a negative function of enforcement  strength (which, as
explained  below, is represented  by the  parameter A). The positive partial cross-derivative
implies  that  the amount of resources it takes to raise enforcement  strength decreases  with
the quality  of government  institutions. (The efficiency  of governemnt  institutions  itself is
assumed  to be exogenous.)
The ratio of public  services to total production  is then given by
G  5
For given rl(.) and t,  an increase in the relative size of the informal sector, I, lowers
capital  productivity  for all agents  in the economy. This is so because informal  production
congests  public  services but does not contribute  to financing  them.
-12-We assume  that the effective  penalty rate, i,  depends  on both the strength  of the
enforcement system and the extent of public dissatisfaction  with the informal sector (as
argued  below, this dissatisfaction  is due to the fact that an increase  in the relative size of
the informal  sector is most likely  associated  with a decrease in everyone's productivity.)
The strength of the enforcement system affects the effective penalty rate because it
determines the ability to detect and punish informal activities.  As explained above,
increasing  enforcement  effectiveness  takes away fiscal resources, the more so the lower
the quality of government  institutions.
The penalty rate is then given by
it  =  T(X,I),  O<X<1
(6) ->0,  ->0 ax  ai
where X measures  the strength of the enforcement  system, and the relative size of the
informal sector, I, measures public dissatisfaction  with the effects of informality  on
capital's rate of return.  Having the effective  penalty rate partially depend  on the size of
the informal  sector is a simple  way to endogenize  public policy in the face of informality
(although  there is no claim that such policy is optimal.)
A simple  functional  form that conforms  with equation  (6), additionally  presenting
positive interaction  between the parameters  X  and I, is the following:
11 =  XI  (7)
-13-Equilibrium
We restrict ourselves to the study of an interior solution, that is, one where the
model's parameters are such that both sectors, formal and informal, coexist in the
economy. Then, given  that  there is free mobility  across sectors, in equilibrium  the formal
and informal  rates  of return  must  be equalized  at all times. This condition determines  the
relative size of the informal  sector in equilibrium. From equations  (2) and (7),
C(1  ,))8a  =(1-T)  (8)
Therefore, 7
(9)
where  the sign above each parameter  indicates  the sign of the partial derivative of I with
respect to this parameter.  The following  results concerning the determination  of the
informal  sector's  relative  size are obtained  from equation  (9). When  the tax rate and, thus,
the incentive to evade taxes rise, the informal  sector expands.  If in the composition  of
public services, a larger share corresponds  to those services not available to informal
agents  (e.g., police,  judicial,  and legal  systems),  then  the equilibrium  size of I drops.  The
relative  size of the informal  sector  also  decreases  when enforcement  strength rises.  Given
that an improvement in the quality of government institutions allows strengthening
-14-enforcement without higher drain on fiscal resources, an increase in q is also likely to lead
to a smaller informal sector.  Finally, when public services are more productive relative
to private services, making public services forgone by informal activities more important
in production,  the relative size of the informal sector is smaller.
Given the equilibrium value for 1, the economy's net capital rate of return, r,  is
given by,
r = [A  (I1  -i)T']  IXf  oq) I - xj,ki6 a)!]  (10)
The  expression  in the first  set  of brackets corresponds  to  the case when there  is no
informal sector.  The rate of return in such case is first increasing and then decreasing in
the tax rate.  The informal sector, through its detrimental impact on the availability of
public services, creates an additional negative effect of the tax rate on the capital rate of
return.
Utility Optimization
Agents  in the economy maximize the value of discounted utility subject to their
budget constraint:
Max  U =f  e  Pt dt
0
(11)
subject  to  k1(t)  = y1(t)  - ci(t)
=  rki(t)  - c,(t)
-15-where  p  is the constant rate  of time  preference.  We  follow the common  practice  of
assuming that the instantaneous utility function has a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, which is equal to 1/0  in equation (11).  As in other Ak growth models, the
rate of return, r,  is independent of the path of capital accumulation.  The first-order and
transversality conditions imply the following constant rate of consumption growth:
t )  = y  = !(r-p)  (12)
Growth
As in the Rebelo (1991) Ak growth model, there are no transitional dynamics in this
model.  The growth rates of aggregate capital (K), aggregate production  (1), as well as
formal  (Y F) and informal (Y' ) production,  are constant and equal to the consumption
growth  rate,  y.8 The economy's  long-run  growth  rate  depends  on  the  technology,
preference,  and  policy parameters;  in this  sense,  the  model  is one  of  "endogenous"
growth.  From equations (10) and (12), we obtain an expression for the economy's  growth
rate:
y  =  > i[A(l_T)a]  |rl|,q|1-(P  (13)
As the quality of government institutions  improves (higher q), the growth rate rises
because a larger share of tax revenues is allocated to finance public services.  As explained
-16-above,  an  improvement  in  the  quality  of  government  institutions can  also  lead  to  a
stronger, less costly enforcement system and, therefore,  to a smaller informal sector;  this
results in less congestion of public services and, thus, higher growth.  A decrease in the
amount of public services available to informal agents (lower 6) also improves growth by
reducing congestion of public services due to informality.
The effect of strengthening enforcement on the growth rate is ambiguous.  On the
one hand,  it decreases congestion of public services due to informality; but on the other
hand,  it  takes away  fiscal  resources  that  could be  used  to  finance  public  services.
However,  given a standard cost function for enforcement (e.g.,  U-shaped average cost
curve),  strengthening enforcement  when it is initially at a small  level will produce a
congestion-reduction  effect that outweighs the resource-cost effect,  thus increasing the
economy's growth rate.
The effect of an increase iri the tax rate on growth, discussed in the next section,
can also be positive or negative: even though an increase in the tax rate both induces more
public-service congestion due to informality and reduces the private net rate of return,  it
may also lead to a larger amount of public services.
Optimal Tax Policy
To examine optimal tax policy, we compare this model with the Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1992 (henceforth B-SM) model, in which the informal sector is not present.  The
optimal tax rate when public services are subject to congestion in the B-SM model is given
by
-17-*  a
UB-S  =I  +  a  (14)
It can be shown that in the present model, under certain parameter conditions 9 , the
optimal tax rate involves  some informality  and is related to the other parameters of interest
as follows,'
+  +
r  =  (a,X,5)
(15)
t  <t 3-SM
The optimal tax rate in this model is lower than in the B-SM case because here an
increase  in tax rates has the additional negative effect of inducing more public-service
congestion  due to informality.  (In the B-SM case, an  increase in the tax rate has two
opposite effects on growth.  In the first place, a higher tax rate increases the amount of
public services, holding production constant. On the other hand, a higher tax rate reduces
the private net rate of return, holding public services constant.  For lower-than-optimal tax
rates, the public-service positive effect dominates the private-net-rate-of-return negative
effect.  Given that in our model the optimal tax rate is lower than that in the B-SM model,
at tr  the public-service effect dominates the private-net-rate-of-return effect,  but they are
balanced by the additional "informality" effect.)
The optimal tax rate,  t*,  increases with a because this parameter determines the
extent of the public-service congestion externality to be internalized by the proportional
production tax (which in this case acts as a user fee; see Barro and Sala-i-Martin,  1992).
-18-The effects  of enforcement  strength  (X) and  the share  of public  services available  to
informal  agents (6) on the optimal tax rate are explained as follows: When informality
becomes less attractive (because  of higher A, and/or lower 6), a sufficiently small increase
in the tax rate does not lead to more public-service congestion due to informality.
In Figure 1, the solid line graphs the growth rate, y,  as a function of the tax rate,
r,  in our model; the dotted-line graphs this relationship in the B-SM model, which does
not allow informality and where all tax revenues are used to finance public services.  As
6 decreases, X increases from a sufficiently low level, and q rises, the growth function in
our model shifts upwards and to the right; therefore,  the growth rate becomes higher for
all values of the tax rate, and the optimum tax rate becomes larger.
Growth and Informality
From  the  model presented above,  the following conclusion can be  drawn.  In
countries where the tax burden is larger than optimal and where the enforcement system
is  too weak, the relative size of the informal sector is negatively correlated with the rate
of economic growth; in other words, changes, both in policy parameters and in the quality
of government  institutions, that promote an increase in the relative size of the informal
economy will also generate a reduction in economic growth.
THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
This section presents some evidence on both the determinants  of the informal sector
and its effect on the provision of public services and economic growth in Latin American
countries.  The estimation period is the early 1990's.51
-19-Determinants  and Size of the Informal  Sector
Estimating the size of the informal sector is difficult, particularly when it is defined
as the sector that evades regulations and taxes.  Several approaches have been used in the
literature, all with limited success." 2 This paper uses a statistical model that considers the
relative  size  of  the  informal  sector  (informal  production  as  a  percentage  of  total
production) as a latent variable that potentially has multiple causes and for which multiple
indicators can be found.  This Multiple-Indicator  Multlple-Cause (MIMIC) model was first
used for the estimation of the size of the informal sector by Frey and Weck-Hanneman
(1984); they concentrated their study on OECD countries.  We have chosen this approach
for  the following reasons.  First,  in the process of estimating the size of the informal
sector, we obtain and test the significance  of the estimated effects of some causal variables
on the informal sector.  Second,  given that we estimate the size of the informal sector
jointly  for all countries in the sample, we can make cross-country comparisons and use
those estimates to assess their correlation with other variables of interest.  Third, we can
use the information contained in different alternative or complementary indicators of the
informal sector in a single estimation process.
The variables serving as either causes or indicators of the informal sector have been
selected in accordance with the theory and discussion presented in the previous sections
of the paper.  The causal variables considered are the following:  First, the tax burden,
proxied by  the highest statutory corporate  income tax rate  in the country." 3 Second,
government-imposed restrictions on labor markets, measured by the Rama (1995) index
divided by per capita GDP to control for differences in labor productivity across countries.
-20-The Rama index is constructed by averaging the normalized values of eight labor-related
variables, namely, number of days of annual leave with pay,  number of days of maternity
leave, social security contribution as a percentage of wages, government employment as
a percentage of labor force, minimum wage as a percentage of average wage, severance
pay, number of ILO conventions ratified, and percentage of labor force in unions.  Rama
calculated this index for 31 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean for the period
1980-92, when labor regulations remained basically unchanged.  The third causal variable
considered in the model is the strength and efficiency of government institutions proxied
by an average of three subjective indicators reported by International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG), namely, quality of the bureaucracy, corruption  in government, and rule of law." 4
Restrictions  on labor markets were not explicitly included in the theoretical model;
however,  they can be understood as a form of tax burden in the model, particularly the
portion of tax burden that is not transformed into productive public services.  As discussed
in  section  II,  restrictions  on labor markets are  important factors  in the  formation of
informal economies, particularly in Latin America where these regulations are some of the
most  stringent  in  the  developing  world.  The  variable  strength  and  efficiency  of
government  institutions  is directly  related  to  two variables  in  the theoretical  model,
namely, the strength of enforcement (X)  and the quality of government  institutions (q).
We expect that, in the sense of multiple regression analysis, the variables proxying
for tax burden and labor market restrictions be positively related to the size of the informal
sector,  and  that the variable proxying  for  the strength and  efficiency of  government
institutions be negatively related to it.
-21-The variables serving as indicators are,  first,  the rate of value-added tax (VAT)
evasion and, second, the percentage of the non-agricultural labor force does not contribute
to social security.  VAT evasion data are taken from an IMF study conducted in 1993 by
Silvani and Brondolo.  Data on the percentage of non-agricultural labor force that does not
contribute to social security are taken from the World Bank study Averting the Old Age
Crisis (1995).  These indicators reflect the two most important aspects of the informal
sector in Latin America, namely, non-compliance  with taxes and labor market regulations.
Whereas the rate of VAT evasion proxies directly for the share of informal production, the
percentage of non-agricultural  workers not covered by social security proxies for the share
of informal employment.
The MIMIC Model
The  MIMIC  model  of  a  latent  variable  (Joreskog and  Goldberger,  1975)  is
specified as follows,
I  =  'X+  e
Z  41 + i  (16)
and  E(qi')  =  0',  E(6 2)  = oE,  E(pt')  =  Q, a  diagonal matrix
In the first equation, the latent variable I is linearly determined, subject to a disturbance,
by a set of observable exogenous causes X.  In the second equation,  the latent variable
linearly determines, subject to disturbances, a set of observable endogenous indicators Z.
A reduced-form  equation  is obtained  by  substituting  the first  into the second
-22-equation,
Z  =C  X  +  e)  +
(17)
='X  + v
Estimation of the structural parameters is obtained through maximum likelihood,  making
use of the restrictions implied in both the coefficient matrix II and the covariance matrix
of  the error  term v.  The basic idea of the MIMIC  model is that the latent variable I
accounts completely for the intercorrelations of the indicators Z.  Once the effects of the
causal variables X and the disturbance E on each of the indicators are removed, there is no
correlation among the indicators.
Note that the reduced-form parameters remain unchanged when '1  is multiplied by
a scalar and f and OE are divided by the same scalar.  Therefore,  in order to remove the
indeterminacy in the structural parameters, it is necessary  to adopt a normalization, setting,
for instance, one of the coefficients in 4 equal to one.  A normalized estimate of the latent
variable can be obtained from the estimated values of the causal-variable coefficients P (see
the first equation in (16)).  We can then compare the differences in the latent-variable
values of any two units (countries in our case) and, thus, rank all units accordingly.  The
level of the latent variable, however, remains undetermined unless additional information
is obtained (or assumed.)
Given that it is difficult to compare the effects of different explanatory variables
on  the  same  dependent variable when they have different  units of  measurement (and
-23-specially when the regression  coefficients  have been normalized  by setting one of them
equal to an arbitrary value), it is useful to standardize the regression coefficients as
follows,
px= p  a  (18)
where P represents  an estimated  regression  coefficient, a represents  an estimated  standard
deviation,  and the subscripts  x and I denote,  respectively,  a given explanatory  variable and
the dependent  variable. The standardized  coefficient  is, therefore, the expected change  in
standard-deviation  units of the dependent  variable that is produced by a one standard-
deviation change of a given explanatory variable when the other variables are held
constant.
Estination Results
Figure 2 reports the estimation  results. The standardized  regression  coefficients
and their respective  t-values (in parenthesis)  are presented  by the arrow pointing in the
direction  of influence  in the model. 15
The coefficients  on the three  causal  variables in the model have the expected  signs
and are statistically  significant  at the 10% level. Both the tax burden and labor-market
restrictions  affect positively the relative size of the informal  sector, with a one standard-
deviation  increase  in each  of them  producing a rise in the informal  sector of 0.33 and 0.49
standard deviations, respectively.  The strength and efficiency of  the government
institutions  has a negative impact  on the informal sector, with a one standard-deviation
-24-increase in the former leading to a decrease of 0.42 standard deviations in the latter.
Therefore,  the theoretical  model's conclusions  concerning  the determinants  of the informal
sector are validated  by the statistical  evidence  of the MIMIC  model.
The VAT  evasion  rate  and the percentage  of non-agricultural  workers not covered
by social security perform well as indicators  of the relative size of the informal sector.
The estimated  latent variable explains  75 % of the variance of the first indicator  and 34 %
of the variance of the second one.
Although the small size of the sample merits caution on the evaluation of the
results, several goodness-of-fit  statistics, including those that adjust for degrees of
freedom, support the underlying  model (see the bottom of Figure 2).  The Chi-square
statistic for the null hypothesis that the constraints on the residual covariance matrix
implied  by the model  are valid has a p-value  of 0.78.  The Joreskog and Sorbom (1985),
Bentler and Bonett (1980), and Bollen (1986) indices (which do  not have a known
distribution  and whose  values  may  range from 0 to 1) also support the statistical  model  as
they are quite close to 1, a value which  represents  perfect fit.
Using the  procedure outlined in  the previous section, we can  estimate the
standardized  values (z-values)  of the relative size of the informal  sector for all countries
in our sample. These estimates  are presented  in Table 1.  The countries  with the largest
informal  sector  are Bolivia,  Panama, and Peru, countries  which in the early 1990's  were
notorious for  their  restrictive labor-market regulations and  poor  quality of  their
enforcement systems. They are followed  by two Central American  countries, namely,
Guatemala  and Honduras. In the middle  of the list we find, Brazil, Colombia,  Uruguay,
-25-Venezuela, Ecuador, and Mexico.  Finally, the countries with the smallest informal sector
are Costa Rica, Argentina, and Chile; in the early  1990's these three countries were the
most advanced in the region in terms of market-oriented economic reforms.
The correlation of the size of the informal sector with real per capita GDP in 1990
is -0.70, and its correlation with the share of urban population in the same year is -0.53.
This suggests that the size of the informal sector is related to the development level of the
country.  Governments in less developed countries may attempt to regulate and tax their
economies  according  to the standards of the more developed ones without having the
capacity to enforce compliance.  Enforcement of regulations and taxes is difficult in less
developed countries because they tend to have weak bureaucracies,  frail legal institutions,
and poorly educated, largely rural populations.
As mentioned  above, the standardized z-values of the latent variable enables us to
determine  only the relative position of countries in the sample.  In order to obtain the
absolute value of the size of the informal sector (as a percentage of GDP), two points must
be fixed: one to set the overall scale, another to set the distance between the ranks.  We
use the following two assumptions: First, the average size of the informal sector is the
same as the average of the VAT evasion rate.  Second, the size of the informal sector in
Chile is the same as its VAT evasion rate.  These assumption are sensible because, first,
the VAT evasion rate is directly related to the share of informal production (whereas our
second indicator is more closely linked to informal labor employment);  second, a large
fraction of the variance of the VAT evasion rate is explained by the size of the informal
sector according to our statistical model.  The last column of Table  1 show our estimated
-26-values of the size of the informal sector, as a percentage of GDP.
The VAT evasion rate is calculated as a ratio to official GDP.  Therefore,  given
that the VAT evasion rate has been used to pin down the overall scale and the distance
between the ranks of the informal  sector,  the estimated values of the  informal sector
reported in Table 1 are also given as a percentage of official GDP.  The question remains
whether official GDP includes informal production.  National account authorities in Latin
America are aware of the large presence and order of magnitude of the informal sector in
their respective countries.  For this reason they rely not only on income reports to estimate
GDP  but,  most  importantly,  on  sampling  and  surveys  of  production  and  prices  by
economic sectors.  Therefore,  although actual GDP may be  measured with error,  the
direction  of  the bias  is  uncertain.  At  any  rate,  official  GDP  does  not  ignore  the
contribution of the informal sector.
The Relation Between the Informal Sector, Public Infrastructure,  and Economic
Growth
The theoretical  model presented  in section III links the informal sector with the
provision  of public  services  and the rate  of economic  growth. The model predicts that the
relative size of the informal sector is negatively  correlated with both the availability  of
public  services  and the economy's growth rate (except when the increase  in the informal
sector is due to a small rise in the tax rate from a sufficiently  small level or a drop in
enforcement  strength  from a high  and costly level.  Nonetheless,  the case of suboptimally
low statutory tax rates or excessive enforcement  strength hardly applies to any Latin
American  country).
-27-Table  2 reports  some  regression  results. The economy's  growth rate is represented
by the average  growth rate of real per capita GDP for the period 1980-92.  6  This period
is long enough  to minimize  the effect  of business-cycle  fluctuations  on the growth rate and
short enough to be able to assume that the informal  sector is basically stable throughout
the  period.  The provision of  public services is proxied by  an  index of  public
infrastructure, which consists of the average of standardized  values of four indicators.
These indicators  are per capita electricity  consumption,  per capita telephone  mainlines,
percentage  of population  with access  to safe water, and  per capita roads in good condition.
There are some important  public services  not included  in these indicators, most notably,
the police and the judicial system. Nevertheless,  to the extent that these omitted  public
services are  correlated with  the  four  indicators considered, the  proposed public-
infrastructure  index is a good proxy for all available  public services.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 show that the size of the informal sector has a
significantly  negative impact  on real per capita GDP growth, whether or not the public-
infrastructure  index  is included  as an explanatory  variable in the regression. The fact that
the informal sector's size has a negative effect on growth when the index of public
infrastructure  is held  constant  can be explained  in two ways, both probably correct.  First,
an increase  in the informal  sector's size means that more activities  are using some  of the
existing public services less efficiently  or not at all;  second, our public-infrastructure
index does not account for all productive  public services.  Comparing  columns 2 and 3
shows that the public-infrastructure  index affects positive and significantly  the rate of
economic  growth when it is included  as the only explanatory  variable in the regression;
-28-however,  when the size of the informal  sector  becomes  an additional  explanatory  variable,
the coefficient  on the public-infrastructure  index becomes insignificant. The informal
sector, being strongly negatively  correlated to the public-infrastructure  index, captures
most of the index's explanatory  power in the growth regression.
In regression  number  4, the determinants  of the informal sector are used directly
as explanatory  variables. Although  their respective  coefficients  present the expected  sign,
they  are not individually  significant. However, they are jointly significant  (the p-value  of
the F-statistic is 0.0798), which, when coupled with the lack of individual  significance,
indicates  the presence  of multicollinearity. As a "weighted  average" of the tax burden,
labor-market restrictions, and the quality of government institutions, the size of the
informal  sector serves as an overall indicator  of regulatory  efficiency.
There is the possibility  that  the negative  correlation  between  the size of the informal
sector and economic  growth is spurious, in the sense that the size of the informal sector
may be proxying for something different from regulatory efficiency; for example, the
informal  sector size may be proxying for fiscal and monetary  discipline, lack of overall
development, low human capital, and trade restrictiveness,  variables which have been
shown  to be correlated  with  economic  growth. To address  this issue, we ran "augmented"
growth  regressions,  which consider several  explanatory  variables  that represent  different
aspects  of policy and economic  development. The results are presented  in Table 3.  The
conclusion  is that  the size  of the informal  sector  remains  significantly  negatively  correlated
with economic  growth, thus demonstrating  to be an independent  determinant  of growth.
-29-CONCLUSION
This paper presents the view that the informal economy arises when excessive taxes
and regulations are imposed by governments that lack the capability to enforce compliance.
The determinants and effects of the informal sector are studied in an endogenous
growth model whose production  technology depends essentially on congestable public
services. The model concludes that in economies where the statutory tax burden  is larger
than optimal  and where  the enforcement system  is too weak,  the relative  size of the
informal sector is negatively  correlated with the rate of economic growth;  in other words,
changes, both in policy paraneters and the quality of government institutions, that promote
an increase in the relative size of the informal economy will also generate a reduction in
the rate of economic growth.
Many Latin American countries have (or had until recently) a tradition of excessive
regulations and weak government institutions.  The paper uses data from Latin American
countries in the early  1990's to test some of the implications of the model and to provide
estimates for the size of the informal sector throughout these countries.  The empirical
approach  consists of identifying the size of the informal  sector to a latent variable for
which  multiple causes and multiple indicators exist.  The size of the informal sector is
found to depend positively on proxies for tax burden and labor-market restrictions,  and
negatively so on a proxy  for the quality of government  institutions.  Furthermore,  the
empirical  results  indicate that an  increase in the size of the informal  sector negatively
affects growth by,  first,  reducing the availability of public services for everyone in the
economy, and,  second, increasing the number of activities that use some of the existing
-30-public services less efficiently or not at all.  These results hold even when additional
explanatory variables are added to account for other aspects of economic conditions and
policies.
Finally, it is estimated that the largest informal sectors in Latin America are found
in Bolivia, Panama, and Peru, and the smallest, in Chile, Argentina,  and Costa Rica.
-31-ENDNOTES
1.  The concept of informality was first introduced by the 1972 ILO Employment Mission
to Kenya.  For an excellent survey regarding definitions, empirical  studies, and policy
recommendations on the informal sector, see Lubell (1991).
2.  The work by Hernando de Soto, presented in his book The Other Path (1989), has
contributed enormously to the understanding of the role of political institutions and legal
structures in the rise of  informal sectors.  De Soto's analysis draws from the contributions
of Douglas North (1981) and Mancur Olson (1982).
3.  Readers familiar with the determinants of informal economies may want to go directly
to the theoretical model.
4.  See Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Barro (1990), and Rebelo (1991).
5.  Given  that  the codes  of  labor  legislation are  also  rather  extensive  in developed
countries,  it is not surprising to find  "clandestine," or  informal,  employment  in those
countries as well.  However, given that the productivity of labor is higher in developed
than in underdeveloped  countries, the distortionary power of labor regulations in developed
economies is less important. Kaltzmann (cited in De Grazia,  1982, p. 34), discussing the
French experience, writes that "the main reason for clandestine employment is economic:
one of the parties increases his income, the other reduces his costs.  Two economic causes
play  a dominant  role:  inadequate remuneration and the burden of taxation and social
security  costs."  De Grazia  (1982,  p.  35)  writes  that  "In Italy,  the phenomenon  [of
informal  employment]  is ...  more blatant,  if  not universal.  Entire  neighborhoods  of
Naples have been transformed into secret workshops (specializing particularly  in shoe- and
-32-garment-making)  which move on quickly or disappear the moment a visit by the labor
inspectors  seems  likely."  De  Grazia  (1982)  also  reports  that  in  Milan only  5,000
homeworkers,  from  a  total of  100,000,  and  1,000 small enterprises,  from  a total  of
50,000, are listed on the city's commercial register.  Indeed, the practice of subcontracting
as a means to avoid labor-protection legislation (including prohibitions to employ illegal
immigrants)  has become particularly popular in developed countries, especially the United
States, Canada, Italy, Spain, and France (Portes, Castells, and Benton,  1989.)
6.  The model presented here is a substantially  modified version of the model in Braun and
Loayza (1994).
7.  From  equation  (9),  an  interior  solution  for  I  requires  the  following  parameter
restrictions:
850+t-1  >  0  (-I>0)
(1-A)6a+t-l1<  0  (=I<1)
8.  We assume that the technology, policy, and preference parameters are such that
P  >r>  p
1-0
The second inequality ensures positive growth, and the first one ensures that attainable
utility is bounded  and the transversality condition  holds (see Barro  and Sala-i-Martin,
1995).
9.  If 1-6  < a1/(a+X+aX),  the growth-maximizing tax rate implies some informality.
-33-Otherwise,  that is, if 1-8"  >aX/(a+Xl+a±),  the optimal  tax rate brings  about a fully formal
economy. We assume that the first inequality  holds.
10.  In general, it is not possible  to obtain an explicit solution  for t+.  However, for the
case  when X  = 1 (maximum  strength  of the enforcement  system), T* takes a simple form:
t*=c/(1 +2a).  The comparative  statics  results presented  in equation  (15) for the general
case are obtained  applying  the implicit  function  theorem.
11.  From 1993 to the present, a few countries (notably Peru) have undertaken an
accelerated pace of  market-oriented  reforms.  Given that the period of  estimation
considered in this paper is the early 1990's, the estimated  results may not apply to the
recent experience  of such countries.
12.  For a good survey on different approaches  to the estimation  of the informal sector,
see Gupta and Gupta (1984).
13.  It would have been preferable  to use the average marginal corporate tax rate as the
proxy for tax burden; unfortunately, data on tax revenue by rates was unavailable.
Nevertheless,  the highest tax rate is not only a good measure  of the level of tax rates but
also of their dispersion.
14. The appendix  presents the data used in the paper and their sources.
15. In order  to remove  the indeterminacy  of the structural  coefficients,  the coefficient  on
the VAT evasion  rate was set equal to one;  therefore, a t-test can not be applied to this
coefficient.  Setting  the coefficient  on the other indicator  equal to one produced  essentially
the same results.
16.  The average growth rate was calculated  using the least-squares  method, in order to
-34-make use of the observations  for all years in the period.
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-42-Appendix  I  Data Sources
Causal Variables:
1. Corporate  income  tax rate. Data on corporate income tax rates in 1991 are taken from
Shome  (1992). When  the country  has more  than  one rate, the highest  rate is used.  Bolivia
is a special  case. In 1991, there was no tax on corporate income  per se.  A tax of 3 % of
net worth  was levied  instead. In order to estimate the implied  corporate income  tax rate,
the net-worth  tax rate is divided  by the real interest rate.  For the calculation  of the real
interest rate, the neoclassical-growth-model  relation between growth, real interest and
depreciation rates  is used.  Using the parameter  values presented in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), the real interest rate in Bolivia is estimated at 8.1 %.
2.  Labor market  restrictions. The proxy for labor market restrictions is the ratio of  the
index  of labor  market  regulations  presented in Rama (1995) to real per capita GDP. The
Rama index  is divided  by real  per capita GDP in order to account for differences  in labor
productivity  across  countries. Rama considers  eight types  of labor-market  regulations  for
31 countries in Latin America  and the Caribbean  during the period 1980-92,  when these
regulations  remained  basically  unchanged. The eight variables  considered by Rama are
number  of ILO conventions  ratified,  number  of days of annual leave  with pay, number  of
days  of maternity  leave,  social  security  contribution  as a percentage  of wages, government
employment  as a percentage of labor force, minimum  wage as a percentage of average
wage, severance pay and percentage  of labor force in unions.  After normalizing  each
variable,  the Rama index is obtained  by averaging  over the eight variables. The real per
capita GDP data correspond  to the year 1990  and are taken from Summers-Heston  Penn
-43-World Table 5.6.
3.  The strength of the enforcement  system. The strength of the enforcement  system is
proxied  by an average  of three subjective  indicators  reported in International  Country Risk
Guide  (ICRG)  for the period 1990-92. The three indicators  considered  are quality of the
bureaucracy,  corruption  in government,  and rule of law.  For the indicator quality of the
bureaucracy,  high scores indicate "autonomy  from political  pressure" and "strength and
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government
services",  also existence  of an "established  mechanism  for recruiting  and training."  For
corruption  in government,  lower scores  indicate "high government  officials  are likely to
demand  special  payments"  and "illegal  payments  are generally  expected throughout  lower
levels  of government"  in the form of "bribes connected  with import and export licenses,
exchange  controls,  tax assessment,  police protection, or loans".  Rule of law "reflects the
degree  to which the citizens  of a country are willing to accept the established  institutions
to make and implement  laws and adjudicate  disputes."  Higher scores indicate "sound
political institutions,  a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession  of
power."  Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending  on physical force or illegal
means  to settle  claims." ICRG  is a publication  of Political Risk Services  of Syracuse, NY
and is cited in Knack and Keefer  (1994).
Indicatorg:
1. Value-added  tax evasion  rate.  Data for this variable correspond  to one of the years in
the period 1990-93  for each country in the sample. The VAT evasion rate is calculated
as one minus the tax compliance  rate, where the tax compliance rate is calculated  as
-44-follows,
VAT revenue
compliance  rate  Potential  base of  VAT
Average  VAT rate
The VAT evasion rate data are obtained from Silvani and Brondolo (1993) for Chile,
Honduras,  Guatemala,  Panama,  Uruguay,  Argentina,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Bolivia,  Colombia
and Peru. For Brazil, Costa Rica and Venezuela,  the compliance  rates are not available.
However,  the revenue  productivity  (the percentage  of GDP collected  per point of the VAT
rate) can be obtained from the IMF.  Data on countries with both compliance  rate and
revenue productivity  are used to fit a line relating  these two measures. The relationship
is then used to estimate the compliance  rates for those  three countries.
2.  Fraction of labor force not contributing  to social security. This variable is obtained
from Averting The Old Age Crisis, the World Bank, 1995.  The variable measures  the
number of workers not contributing  to social security as a percentage  of the labor force.
Data are available  for all Latin American countries  in our sample. The years for which
data  are available, however,  are not  the same.  For most countries  the figures correspond
to years  around 1991,  but for some  the latest  available  year is in the mid 80's (e.g. Bolivia
1985, and Guatemala  1986).
Infrastructure:
1. Electricity  Consumption  (KWH  per person) in 1992. This is calculated  as electricity
production x  (1 - system losses). Electricity  production (KWH  per person) and system
-45-losses (% of total output) are obtained from the World  Development  Report 1995, the
World Bank.
2.  Telephone  Mainlines  (per 1,000 persons) in 1992. This variable is obtained from the
World  Development  Report 1995, the World Bank.
3.  Roads  in good condition  (km per million  persons) in 1988. This is calculated  as Road
density (km per million persons) x Roads in good condition (% of paved roads).  Data
are from the World  Development  Report 1994, the World Bank.
4.  Population  with access to safe water (% of total) in 1990.  Data are from the World
Development  Report 1994, the World Bank.
5.  Public  infrastructure  index. It is the simple  average  of the standardized  values of the
above fou; indicators. All indicators  are standardized  by computing  z-values, that is,
dividing  the deviations  from the mean by the standard  deviation.
Growth Rate:
The growth  rates  of real  per capita  GDP from 1980  to 1992  are calculated  using the least-
square method. Real per capita GDP data are from the World Bank National  Accounts.
-46-Table 1.  The Size of the Informal Sector: Standardized and Absolute Values
Standardized Value  Absolute Value
Country  (% of GDP)
Chile  -1.342  18.2
Argentina  -1.107  21.8
Costa Rica  -1.012  23.3
Mexico  -0.762  27.1
Venezuela  -0.523  30.8
Ecuador  -0.494  31.2
Colombia  -0.240  35.1
Uruguay  -0.236  35.2
Brazil  -0.062  37.8
Honduras  0.516  46.7
Guatemala  0.754  50.4
Peru  1.243  57.9
Panama  1.518  62.1
Bolivia  1.746  65.6
Mean  0.000  38.8
Standard deviation  1.000  15.3
-47-Table 2.  The Growth Effects of Public Infrastucture and the Informal Sector
(t-statistics in parenthesis)
Dependent Variable  Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP  Public
(1980-92)  Infrastructure
Index
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Size of the Informal Sector  -0.8852  -0.8435  -0.5814
(-2.61)  (-2.16)  (-2.98)
Public Infrastructure Index  0.5622  0.0718
(1.69)  (0.24)
Corporate Income Tax Rate  -0.4436
(-1.09)
Labor-Market Restrictions  -0.4333
(-0.84)
Strength and efficiency of  0.3598
government institutions  (1.16)
P-value (F-Statistic)  0.0233  0.0798
Adjusted R 2 0.3584  0.1201  0.3068  0.2537  0.3381
Number of Observations  14  14  14  14  14
Note: The above t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.
Regression coefficients are standardized so that they reflect the change in the growth rate
produced by a one-standard deviation of the explanatory variable.
-48-Table 3.  The Informal Sector and Other Determinants of Economic Growth
(t-statistics in parenthesis)
Dependent Variable  Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP  (1980-92)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Size of the Informal Sector  -1.2482  -1.3165  -1.3303  -1.4555  -1.2245
(-3.33)  (4.30)  (-3.79)  (-3.45)  (-3.44)
Real Per Capita GDP, 1980  -0.6418  -0.7956  -0.8906  -0.1523  -1.9685
(-2.04)  (-2.92)  (-2.80)  (-3.84)  (-4.36)
Secondary School  0.4302  0.7341  0.8426  0.7118
Attainment, 1980  (1.86)  (2.32)  (2.66)  (2.34)
Average Tariff for  -0.5226  -0.6138  -0.3439
Intermediate and Capital  (-1.26)  (-1.46)  (-0.86)
Goods, 1985
Average Inflation Rate,  -0.2497  -0.6027
1980-92  (-0.46)  (-1.60)
Public Infrastructure Index,  1.1966
1990  (2.04)
P-value (F-Statistic)  0.0046  0.0077  0.0305  0.0724  0.0365
Adjusted R2 0.4595  0.5119  0.5222  0.4735  0.6490
Number of Observations  14  14  12  12  12
Note: The above t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.
Regression coefficients are standardized so that they reflect the change in the growth rate
produced by a one-standard deviation of the explanatory variable.
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-50-Figure  2.  Results  of  the  MIMIC  Model
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-51-Figure  3.  The  Relation  of Public  Infrastructure  and  Growth  with  the  Informal
Sector
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